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Abstract— We present an efficient implementation of a fair
e-cash protocol especially designed for mobile wireless environ-
ments. Our protocol attempts to offer a reasonable balance
between the anonymity feature on one side, and the possibility
of revoking that anonymity in case that there exist reasonable
doubts about the behavior of a given user. Our system considers
two protocols especially designed for tracing purposes: a coin
tracing and an owner tracing protocol. Furthermore, we propose
the usage of TLS as an extra security layer in order to provide
both, confidentiality and authentication. Our system was written
in Java and it was implemented using wireless technology and
PDA mobile devices.
Keywords: E-Cash, Cryptography, E-Commerce, Mobile Secu-
rity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The era of electronic commerce has changed the way
transactions are being carried out traditionally. Transactions
are now performed through private dedicated networks or
through the internet. Money is being associated with cards
issued by financial institutions, that customers employ to
perform transactions online.
The concept of electronic money was introduced by Chaum
[1]. Electronic money (digital money, or e-cash) tries to
emulate its paper money counter part in terms of functionality.
E-cash refers to cash and the associated transactions that
are performed with it on a communication network. Special
protocols are used to manage secure e-cash transactions. Since
its introduction, several new features such as off-line payment
[2] and divisibility [3] have been added to the concept of
electronic money. Off-line refers to the fact that transactions
can be carried out on-line even if a financial entity involved
is off-line. Divisibility is a property of e-cash that enables
dividing the value of a coin into smaller parts.
Cryptographic techniques have added security and
anonymity to the use of electronic money [4]. In these
systems, special features enable authorities to know how
money has been used and the route that an electronic
transaction has followed [5].
In this contribution we present the design and implemen-
tation of a fair off-line e-cash protocol especially tailored
for mobile environments. We strive for reducing the client
computational effort so that the mobile device performance
(where typically client entities will be implemented) get not
affected by the burden of hosting that application. We pretend
to introduce those modifications without detriment to the
security thanks to the usage of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol for performing secure communications through
a wireless Internet connection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In next
Section, a brief summary of some of the most well known
e-cash protocols is given. Then in Section III we describe our
proposed scheme in detail, which is a variation of the one
proposed in [5], and where several cryptographic tools are
utilized to obtain the desired security properties. In section
IV, we describe the design and Java implementation of an
electronic wallet system. In Section V we discuss the Security
of our proposed system by examining possible attack scenarios
and the way that our system can help to thwart them. Finally
in Section VII concluding remarks are drawn.
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF E-CASH PROTOCOLS
In this section we present a summary and a comparative
analysis of some of the most well known e-cash protocols.
In 1988, David Chaum proposed a way to make electronic
payments anonymously, introducing the concept of e-cash. E-
cash was called in this way because of its similarity with paper
money that guarantees purchaser anonymity. However some
drawbacks of e-cash is that electronic money could be copied
and reused. To avoid that a coin could be reused Chaum [1]
proposed that the Bank keeps a list of all coins spent. This
list is checked to verify that all coins deposited will not be
reused. However, to perform this checking, the Bank should
be online, otherwise a store will not be able to guarantee that
a payment is valid.
Forcing a Bank to stay on-line when a payment is made, is a
strong limitation of this scheme that was corrected by Chaum,
Fiat and Naor [2]. Their model was called off-line cash. In an
off-line cash system, the protocol for deposit/collection occurs
at a different time than the one used for payment/purchasing.
Blind signatures, implemented with RSA public signing key,
are used to guarantee anonymity. The use of the scheme
cut-and-choose allows the Bank to detecting possible frauds
and identify malicious purchasers. The scheme cut-and-choose
was proposed by Michael O. Rabin[6]. In this protocol the
opportunity to commit fraud is determined by the value k/2,
where k is the security parameter employed by a Bank, which
should be greater than 2. The probability of committing fraud
is reduced when the value of k is increased by 1 in 2k/2[7].
Later, Okamoto and Otha[3] proposed a protocol that estab-
lished the desirable properties that electronic money should
have i.e. independence, security, privacy, off-line payment,
transferability, divisibility. This protocol uses a binary tree
representation for constructing a scheme of mutual agreement
whose security relies on the hardness of the factorization
and quadratic residues problems. To tackle the problem of
divisibility authors in [3] proposed to use a binary tree that
allows coin division but forbids falsification or reuse of the
same coin. Unfortunately, it was recognized that this protocol
may be traceable electronically.
In 1993, the single-term protocols were proposed. Among
these protocols, the protocol proposed by Ferguson[8] com-
bines RSA digital signatures and random blind signatures.
In this system it is proposed to use the scheme of secret
sharing, with which it is possible to know who commits fraud.
Unfortunately, the security of this protocol was not tested [5],
being this protocol superseded by the protocol proposed by
Brands[4].
In 1993, S. Brands[4] proposes a new protocol, which
was a refinement of the protocols proposed by: Chaum and
Pedersen[9], and Cramery and Pedersen[10]. In this protocol,
Brands makes use of the homomorphic properties of discrete
logarithms. This scheme is based in the concepts of Schnorr
digital signatures and the problem of representing groups of
prime order.
In 1996, Frankel, Tsiounnis and Yung [11], [12] proposed a
new architecture, creating the concept of Fair Off-line e-Cash.
Their scheme works under the S. Brands e-cash model. In
their proposal, a fourth entity called the Authority was added,
which is used to guarantee the anonymity of a purchaser as
long as he/she makes legal transactions. If a purchaser tries to
commit fraud, the Bank could request the tracing of a coin or
the tracing of the owner of a coin. In the protocols for coin or
coin owner tracing only the Bank and the authority interact.
With this feature Frankel, Tsiounnis and Yung tried to avoid
crimes such as money laundry, blackmailing etc. in an efficient
way.
Recently, several other protocols have been proposed [13],
[14], [15], [16]. The protocol proposed in [13] is focused on an
e-cash system for mobile devices. However, one weakness of
this scheme is the requirement for the Bank to publish its coins
to the Stores. The publication of these data makes difficult to
consider that protocol as an off-line protocol.
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In the following, we propose an e-cash protocol based on
the one presented in [4], which corresponds to a variant of the
FOLC scheme proposed in [11].
A. A Fair Off-line Electronic Scheme
A fair off-line Electronic scheme defines the following four
entities,
• The Bank: The financial entity, which provides and
warrants the electronic money that is given to the client.
The Bank is also responsible for detecting fraudulent
transactions.
• The Purchaser: The entity that will use the electronic
money for purchasing.
• The Store: This entity has as one of its functions,
exchanging products or services for electronic money.
It is also responsible for verifying the authenticity of
the electronic money involved in a transaction. If a
transaction is valid this entity will be enabled to deposit
the electronic money received into its banking account.
• The Authority: This entity provides information on coin
tracing or the ownership of a coin, when this procedure
is legally allowed. The authority may perform this task
any time under suspicion that malicious activity is being
carried out on the part of a purchaser.
Additionally, this schemes comprises five sub-protocols,
namely,
• Protocol for money withdrawal: Defines the interaction
between the bank and the purchaser who wants to get a
coin.
• Protocol for payment/purchasing: Defines the interaction
between the purchaser and the product or service supplier
Store.
• Protocol for deposit/collection: Defines the requirements
that a Store must meet for being enabled to deposit coins
into its baking account.
• Protocol for owner tracing: this protocol is executed by
the Bank and Authority entities and is used to trace the
identity of the owner of a specific coin. To perform this
task, the Bank sends to the Authority a brief of what
it was received through the deposit protocol. Next, the
Authority sends back a string, containing the information
with which the Bank is able to obtain the identity of a
client by accessing its banking account data base.
• Protocol for Coin Tracing: this protocol is also executed
by the Bank and Authority entities and is used to trace
a coin created during the execution of the withdrawal
protocol. The Bank provides to the Authority a brief
of the withdrawal protocol, with which the Authority is
capable of knowing where the coin has been spent.
In the rest of this Section we give a mathematical descrip-
tion of all cryptographic operations that the four entities of
the protocol just described must perform in order to correctly
execute above five subprotocols.
B. Parameters Description
The notation and principal parameters to be used to describe
protocol’s operation is as follows:
• q : parameter, 2159 < q < 2160
• p : given l such that 0 ≤ l ≤ 8, let p be a prime such
that 2511+64l < p < 2512+64l, with the property that q
divides (p− 1)/2, i.e, q|(p− 1)/2.
• g : the square of a primitive root mod p.
• g1, g2 : After picking two random numbers x1,x2 ∈ Zq ,
g1 and g2 are defined as g1x1 mod p and g2x2 mod p,
respectively.
• XB : private key for the Bank
• h1, h2 : Bank’s public keys
• XT : Trustee’s private key
• f2 : Trustee’s public key where, f2 = gXT2 mod p
• IdStore : store identifier
• u1 : a secret random number for the creation of the
Purchaser identifier.
• I : Purchaser identifier.
• s : a secret random number for coin creation
• w: a serial number for coin creation.
• H: hash function
• (A,B, z, a, b, r): A coin
• r1, r2 : parameters for fraud control
• t : time stamp
C. Initialization Process
First, the Bank performs an initialization procedure, select-
ing two prime numbers p and q such that q=(p-1)/2.
With g being the square of a primitive root ∈ Gp, three
random numbers x0,x1,x2 ∈ Zq are picked for computing,
g ≡ gx0 , g1 ≡ gx1 , g2 ≡ gx2 (mod p)
The numbers, g, g1 and g2 are published. Lastly a random
number XB is chosen, which will be the Bank’s secret key.
With this key h, h1 , h2 and h3 are created as follows,
h ≡ gXB mod p , h1 ≡ gXB1 mod p ,
h2 ≡ gXB2 mod p h3 ≡ fXB2 mod p
Those numbers will be published as the Bank identification.
The Purchaser chooses a secret number and calculates what
will become his account number as,I ≡ gu1 (mod p)
The number I is sent to the Bank, jointly with the user
information (name, address, etc.). The Bank responds to the
Purchaser with: z’ ≡ ( Ig2)XB (mod p). Lastly, the Bank regis-
ters each of the Stores with an identification number IdStore.
Once this initialization process has been accomplished, the
entities Bank, Purchaser and Store will be ready to start
interacting according to the protocols specified below.
D. Withdrawing Protocol
The goal of this protocol is enabling the Purchaser to obtain
a valid coin created by the Bank. A coin will be granted as
long as the Bank is sure of knowing the identity of who is
requesting the coin. The coin is represented as a six-tuple:
{A, B, z, a, b, r}. These values are generated as follows,
1) Coin Request. The Purchaser requests a coin from the
Bank, by identifying himself with his number I and
choosing a random number s, which is used to compute
A′1and A
′
2. The Bank will verify that the Purchaser is
in its banking account data base. Additionally, the Bank
must verify that the number s chosen by the Purchaser
during the coin generation process is the same as the
one created for A′2.. This verification is accomplished
by using the Schnorr authentication protocol [17].
Purchaser Bank
Coin request =⇒
s, k ∈R Zq
A′1 = Ig2f
s−1
2
A′2 = f
s
2 , y = g
k
2 =⇒
⇐= e=H(I | y | XB)
r = es+ k =⇒ if gr2 = A′e1 y
2) Definition of coin identifier The Bank chooses a random
number w, with which it will identify a coin. Then,
it calculates the parameters a′and b′ and sends those
values to the Purchaser.
Purchaser Bank
⇐= a′ = gw and b′ = (A′1)w
3) Coin Creation. The Purchaser chooses four random
numbers and calculates A, B, z, a, b. All these cal-
culations depend on the random numbers selected and
the numbers a′and b′ . Once this is done, it calculates c
using a hash function H followed by a division by the
value u. This value c′ is sent to the Bank.
Purchaser Bank
A = (A′1)
s
z′ = hu11 h2h
s−1
3 , z = z
′s
x1, x2, u, v ∈R Zq
B1 = gx11 , B2 = g
x2
2
B = [B1, B2]
a = (a′)ugv
b = (b′)suAv
c = H(A|B|z|a|b)
c′ = c/u =⇒
4) Coin Signature. This process is accomplished using a
Schnorr signature protocol [17]. Thus, the Bank cal-
culates r′ using the value w (coin identifier) and the
value of XB (secret key of the Bank). A Purchaser may
calculate r with the random values u and v to form the
six-tuple (A, B, z, a, b, r), which will identify a coin.
Purchaser Store
⇐= r′ = c′XB + w
r = r′u+ v mod q
Verify:
gr = hc
′
a′
(Ig2f2)r
′
= z′c
′
b′
E. Payment/purchasing protocol
In this protocol, the Purchaser attempts to use a coin to pay
for a product or service received from a Store. The protocol
consists of three phases: first the coin is verified as being
valid; second the values D1, D2 are verified, these values will
be useful for owner tracing; and third, information is obtained
so that a Bank could be able to identify any person trying to
commit fraud. The protocol consists of the following steps:
1) Establishing a purchase. To start this protocol, the Store
and Purchaser agree with respect to the price of a
product and the amount of coins that are needed for
the purchase.
Purchaser Store
Purchase ⇐⇒ Sell
2) Sending a coin. The Purchaser sends a coin to the Store,
along with four extra values, (A1,A2, D1, D2). With the
first two the coin authenticity will be verified and the last
two will be useful for owner tracing. The parameters,
D1 and D2 are created in such a way that the Store can
prove that the entity that created them is the same as the
one that granted the coin. That way the Authority will
be able of performing the trace protocol effectively in
case that this feature may be required.
Purchaser Store
A1 = Is, A2 = gs2
m ∈R Zq
D1 = gm2
D2 = I + fm2
(A1, A2, D1, D2) =⇒
a coin (A,B, z, a, b, r) =⇒
3) Validating the coin. Store verifies a coin by performing
the calculations described below. With these calculations
it is shown that a Store can accept or reject a coin with
the certainty that the coin, if it is accepted, is valid and
that an invalid coin will always be rejected.
Purchaser Store
=⇒ if A = A1A2
if A 6= 1, D2 6= 1
if Sign(A,B) = (z, a, b, r)
4) Hash Function for a coin. In the second phase of the
protocol, the Store starts calculating d which is the
evaluation of the hash function H0 from A, B, M ( Store’s
identifier) and a time stamp t. Besides computing this
hashes three more computations are required, obtaining,
D′, f ′2 and f
′
3 which are needed in order to verify the
authenticity of the values D1 and D2. Once these values
are calculated, they are sent to the Purchaser.
Purchaser Store
d = H(A1, B1, A2, B2, IdStore, t)
S0 ∈R Zq
D′ = DS01 D2
f ′2 = f2g
S0
2 , f
′
3 = D
S0
1 /g
S0
2
⇐= d,D′, f ′2, f ′3
5) Control fraud data. The Purchaser calculates r1 and
r2 (which are the data that the Bank will use to get
the identity of anyone attempting to perform a fraud),
calculates V (for owner tracing ) and finally it send those
values to the Store.
Purchaser Store
r1 = d(u1s) + x1
r2 = ds+ x2
V = H([(D′ − f ′2)/f ′3]s)
r1, r2, V =⇒ Verify:
If gr11 = A
d
1B1
If gr22 = A
d
2B2
If H(A1|AS02 )
F. Deposit/collection protocol
This protocol stipulates how the Store cash the coins pre-
viously owned by Purchasers, by asking the Bank to deposit
them into his/her account. In this protocol, a coin is sent to
the Bank in the form of a tuple (A1,A2, D1, D2, A, B, z, a, b,
r) . This tuple was built by the Bank during the withdrawal
protocol. Store also sends to the Bank the information required
for fraud detection, namely, (r1 ,r2 ,d, V) .
Store Bank
(A1,A2, D1, D2, if A = A1A2
A, B, z, a, b, r) =⇒ if A 6= 1, D2 6= 1
if Sign(A,B) = (z, a, b, r)
(r1 ,r2 ,d, V) =⇒ Verify:
If gr11 = A
d
1B1
If gr22 = A
d
2B2
If H(A1AS02 )
G. Fraud Control
In order to avoid frauds in the processing of electronic
money, a secure e-cash system must have a way to detect
them. The most common type of fraud is repeated use of an
electronic coin issue known as the double spending problem.
Our protocol specifies a mechanism that allows knowing the
identity of those who attempt to pay out with the same coin
twice. To see how this mechanism works, let us assume that
Store-1 sends to the Bank the tuple (r1, r2, d) and that a Store-
2 sends the tuple (r1’, r2’, d’), both invoices were produced by
the reuse of the same coin with different vendors. In this case
the Bank will obtain the value u, with a simple calculation as
shown below. Given that:
Fig. 1: scenarios used for the movile e-cash system
r1 - r1’≡ us(d− d′) and r2 - r2’≡ s(d− d′) mod q; Then,
u≡ (r1 − r1′) /(r2 − r2′) mod q.
Therefore the Bank can calculate: I ≡ gu1 (mod p), thus
identifying the malicious Purchaser.
H. Owner Tracing
Tracing the owner of a coin is a simple task, since each
coin contains the identity of its owner. We modified Brands’
scheme in [4] to use an special encryption system, in such a
way that the encryption is also linked to the coin. To trace
a coin’s owner, the Bank sends the ciphered data (D1,D2)
to the Authority, enabling it to decipher the value I=D2 −
(D1)XT mod p, which is the identity of the coin’s owner.
In this process we have assumed that the Store previously
performed the coin verification procedure.
I. Coin Tracing
Coin tracing is performed by changing the way in which the
value A is calculated during coin generation. Let us recall that
the coin was generated via three generators, namely, g1 , g2
and f2. The first two values are used to verify a coin, and the
third one to trace the coin. From the withdrawal protocol we
know that the value A was generated as, A=Isg2sf2 mod p.
This parameter is later signed using a Schnorr digital signature.
Lastly, to trace coins, the Bank will have to send the value A′2
to the Authority, so that the Authority calculates A′2
XT =
gs2 = A2, and sends back this value to the Bank. This step
will allow the Bank to know, which Store has provided such
value. In this way, the Bank will know where a coin was spent.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The protocol reviewed in this paper, use well defined,
and independent entities. The design presented in this sec-
tion follows the same strategy, keeping the entities and the
processes linked to each sub-protocol in a separated manner.
The e-cash system was designed in such a way that it could
be incorporated into an existing e-commerce system. The
system was tested using TLS in the communication layer
through the internet. We also tested the system in an ad-
hoc wireless communication network, using PDA as client
and TLS to guarantee secure communication between entities.
Figure 1 shows the two scenarios tested in the e-cash system
implemented in this work.
In order to implement both scenarios shown in Figure 1,
we wrote a code using Java WEB version, i.e., using JSP’s
and Servlets technologies, on the Apache’s Tomcat servlet
container. MySQL DBMS was used to store user data and e-
commerce transactions. Clients running on PDA’s or desktops
were implemented as applets. Whereas the entities Bank, Store
and Authority are all WEB servers which additionally of
holding a WEB site, they host WEB applications that perform
the corresponding protocols. That application is independent of
the WEB site implementation, allowing the possibility that this
application may be installed in any WEB site. Figure 2 shows
the complete system architecture and the main components of
each entity.
It should be noticed that all Purchasers owning personal
computers may interact via HTTP/HTTPS with any of the
protocol authorities. Whenever an entity needs to execute
any of the sub-protocols, a user must download via Internet
a signed applet with which all required operation will be
performed using his/her default WEB browser. This scheme
brings a process which is virtually user-transparent. However,
those purchasers using a PDA must access to the system via
HTTP/HTTPS. Then, after all the necessary data are available
they must initialize an application loading the data obtained
via WEB. Only then, they will be able to execute each sub-
protocol application. This relative inconvenience is due to
the restrictions that PDA devices currently show whose WEB
browsers do not support signed applets.
V. SYSTEM SECURITY
A. Double Spending Problem
The double spending problem occurs whenever any user
and/or entity attempts to use a coin more than once. There
exist three scenarios in which such action could happen. Below
we discuss briefly each one of them.
Fig. 2: Design
Malicious Purchaser: The first scenario considered occurs
when a Purchaser attempts to spend his/her coin two or more
times in different Stores. When this problem shows up, the
Stores have not chance to detect the fraudulent transaction.
However, when both Stores deposit their coins in the Bank,
this entity will be able to detect that received coins are actually
the same. Then, having double spent coin’s information the
Bank can deduce the identity of the person who committed
fraud. Therefore the Bank assumes the cost of this fraud since
involved Stores do receive their money. However, since the
Bank can obtain cheater’s identity it can initiate a legal process
in order to recover its money. Notice that our protocol can only
detect the double spending problem, but not prevent it.
Malicious Store: The second scenario occurs when a Store
attempts to deposit two or more times the same coins received
by an honest Purchaser. However, this situation means no
problem due to the fact that if the Bank accepts two identical
coins the verification parameters would be identical. Therefore,
assuming that a Store has the coin (A,B, z, a, b, r), then after
executing the purchasing protocol the Bank can obtain r1 y r2.
If it is attempted to spend this same coin twice, the Bank will
reject it, in virtue that the Bank will notice the values d, r1 y r2
would be the same. On the other hand, the Store cannot create
valid r1 and r2 parameters since it does not know the values
u1, x1,, x2 and s, which are only known by the Purchaser.
Store and Purchaser Colluded: A third scenario would occur
in case that the Store and the Purchaser collaborate in a
joint effort to cheat the Bank. Even in this case it would
be always possible for the Bank to find a guilty person
(either the Purchaser or the Store). Additionally the possibility
that a Purchaser has been impersonated by someone else
is eliminated because it is Bank’s responsibility to verify
customer’s identity at the moment that the withdraw protocol
is being executed.
B. Digital Crimes
A digital crime may be defined as any law violation by
means of digital mediums. Ironically, a classic e-cash system
strives for providing anonymity mechanisms that avoid the
possibility of detecting suspicious users. Therefore, the main
purpose of the coin and owner trace protocol is that of
allowing the identification of a user who is suspected of having
committed a crime.
Kidnapping, Blackmail, Bribes, Money-Laundry: Let us think
in situations where kidnapping, blackmail and bribes kind of
crimes could occur. For instance in a kidnapping situation,
a criminal can demand the ransom to be paid using an e-
cash system. Due to the anonymity feature of a classic e-cash
system it would be a perfect tool for criminals to accomplish
their goals. However, in our system the Authority would be
able of hunting down any criminals provided that they attempt
to spend coins in the electronic system. Therefore, owner and
coin trace protocols are a valuable tool for preventing those
crimes.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A brief performance evaluation in terms of message size and
required number of cryptographic operations is presented in
this Section. The traffic generated in the withdrawal, payment,
deposit and tracing protocols are shown in Table I. Both, wallet
and coin sizes are function of n, where n is the security
parameter defined in Section III. In our experiments we used
n = 128 bits and for this case the wallet size and the coin
size are 384 and 907 bytes, respectively
TABLE I: Protocol Cryptographic Operations
Protocol Crypto Operations Traffic per coin
Withdrawal 15 exponentiations 2 inverses 1.7 KB
Payment 6 exponentiations 1 inverses 2.5 KB
Deposit 0 exponentiations 0 inverses 1.9 KB
Tracing 1 exponentiations 1 inverses 657 B
Finally, the timing needed for coin creation were of 1 and
3 seconds in the server and in the PDA client, respectively. In
our experiments the Bank and the Purchaser were hosted in
a PC computer Pentium IV with 128-MB RAM and a PDA
Sharp-Zaurus5600, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a comparative analysis of
some well known e-Cash protocols. Furthermore, inspired in
the protocols reported in [4], [11] we proposed a protocol
that has proved to be a feasible option for mobile wireless
environments. With the modifications implemented, the system
is able to trace coins and also trace the owner of such
coins whenever suspicious activity is detected. Our system
exhibit all the desirable features that a secure e-Cash system
should have, namely, independence, security, privacy, off-line
payment, transferability, and divisibility. The proposed archi-
tecture was coded in Java and fully-implemented in personal
computers interacting with PDA devices. Our experiments
show that the e-cash protocol presented in this work can
be efficiently implemented in those mobile devices without
significant detriment of their performance.
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